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Citation: 4 Bernard D. Reams Jr. Law of E-SIGN A Legislative of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Act Public Law No. 106-229 2000 S3908 2002

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that is a hatchery fish. They are killing them so they will not spawn because they say that hatchery stock affects the ethnic purity of the wild stocks.

The real secret about hatchery fish is that their eggs come from wild fish. But, nevertheless, we have so many fish now, apparently, that we have the luxury of clubbing them to death before they can spawn. By the way, the hatchery fish in the Atlantic salmon recovery program are treated the same as wild fish. But in spite of all this, we're told in the Pacific Northwest that we have to take out our dams. We have to take them out in order to have a normative river.

What do we hear from the administration? We hear on the one hand that Fish and Wildlife has concluded the dams have to come out. The National Marine Fisheries Service says we need to study dam breaching for at least 10 years because we do not have a good answer yet. And, by the way, the studies they have been producing are all predicated on data from 1980 to the current date. However, if you look at data dating back to 1960, which is available, you do not come up with extinction modeling. But federal agencies just picked the years that had the worst ocean conditions to argue that the salmon are going to become extinct unless we tear out our dams. I want the fish but I don't want the people to be suckers. I think we are being set up to be that.

I would like to know, also from Mr. GORE, why it is that the Corps of Engineers was about to issue their recommendation, which was don't take the dams out, and they were ordered by the White House not to make that recommendation? Why were they ordered to make no recommendation? What that adds up to, I believe, is that this is not about science—this is about political science. Political science is not the basis upon which this decision should be made, particularly when our rivers are full of fish as we speak.

What are the consequences if they pull the dams out? I have named a few already, but I do know it adds 13 cents a bushel to every farmer's wheat. I know it means $11 million a year lost in revenue to the barging industry. When you take this wheat from the barges and put it on a truck, do you know how many trucks it takes to replace those barges per day? It takes 2,000 semi trucks a day. You say you care about the environment? Are you going to burn that kind of fuel, burn up those kinds of miles, cause that kind of congestion in the city of Portland and the city of Seattle? Not on my watch you will not.

What else does tearing out the dams mean? It means a loss of about $130 million in property values to farmers. What does that mean to property taxes? School support? Roads? All those things are in jeopardy if you take those dams down. Dam breaching takes 37,000 acres of wheat out of production. What happens to those families? Their land goes back to sagebrush.

It takes at least 5,370 direct jobs in Portland. I actually think it is higher than that when you look at the ripple effect. When you take out these dams, you lose longshoremen in Portland and the many other service-related jobs that depend on them. Not only that, but to take these dams out, it would cost $809 million. Some have said that it could cost that much for each dam—I don't know whether we can get through this body an appropriation to destroy Federal assets that will be in the billions of dollars. What are you going to replace the energy with? What are you going to burn? This is crazy.

What else do you lose? You lose 3,033 megawatts of clean hydroelectric power. That is the amount it takes to run the city of Seattle every day. We are going to take that out in the face of projected energy shortages? Not on my watch.

So I say with the Senator from Washington: No, not on our watch.

I say to my fellow citizens in Oregon, this is the most important question you can ask Al Gore. Governor Bush has answered it. Please, Mr. Vice President, tell us what is your position on tearing out hydroelectric power in the Pacific Northwest? One of your agencies says do it. Another says we don't know enough yet. A third says don't do it. And GORE is refusing to answer the question.

We can have our fish and we can have our power. There are many things we can do, short of destroying our energy infrastructure and our clean, hydroelectric power. There are many things we can do to save fish short of the destruction of this kind of energy. To replace our clean energy with any other type, you are going to burn something and Oregonians will live in a dirtier place. I do not want them to.

I ask the Vice President, respectfully, to answer the question, What is your policy on dam breaching?

EUROPEAN UNION HUSHKIT REGULATION

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, is a specialized agency of the U.N. that has been tasked for more than 50 years with the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation. Based in Montreal, this 185 countries strong organization develops international standards on such critical issues as noise, emissions, and air worthiness.

I am saddened to report that, last week, the European Union dealt a severe blow to the integrity and future viability of this critical organization. I, of course, am speaking of the EU's implementation of the so-called hushkit regulation. This regulation bans hushkitted aircraft from being registered in Europe, prohibits such aircraft that are not European registered from flying in Europe within two years, and bars certain reengined aircraft with low by-pass ratios from European airspace. The regulation was implemented despite the fact that the aircraft in question meet the highest international noise standards.

Thankfully, in March, the U.S. filed an Article 84 case within ICAO against the fifteen EU Member States arguing that the regulation violated the Chicago Convention. ICAO will review the matter this fall, and hopefully resolve it in a way that reaffirms its position as the sole, international standard setting body.

Ironically, the EU wants to have its cake and eat it too. EU Members States are now anxious for ICAO to establish new, more stringent, Stage 4 noise standards. Indeed, the U.S. is working with ICAO on this endeavor as we speak. The key question becomes, why should we develop new standards if the EU has demonstrated that the old ones can be disregarded at whim? If the EU wants Stage 4, it must begin by demonstrating its respect for Stage 3 by withdrawing the hushkit regulation.

Mr. President, I will be following the resolution of this dispute very carefully. It is critical to future trading opportunities that the integrity of the ICAO process be upheld.

SECURITY AND COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I am concerned about an emerging issue that has important implications for our national security: the commercial satellite imaging industry. Soon the public will have access to high resolution pictures able to show objects as small as three feet in size.

The rapid evolution of satellite technology has suddenly made the "eye in the sky" accessible to everyone, from foreign governments to the average individual. Secret sites are suddenly no longer secret. Photos of Area 51, a top-secret military installation located in Nevada, were recently made available by a private company selling commercial satellite images. The wide availability of these pictures to any person or country that can afford to buy them has the potential to both help or hinder our security.

Initially satellites were used during the Cold War for defense purposes. These classified images were only available to the government. However, civilians began to benefit from satellite pictures about thirty years ago when the government satellite, Landsat, began to sell photos to the public for agricultural planning purposes. The first commercial satellite launch did not occur until 1986, when France, Sweden and Belgium jointly launched SPOT I.

The technology of satellites today has evolved considerably since

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Landsat, in 1972, began providing photos to the public. Those pictures could only render images of objects larger than 250 feet across.

This all changed when earlier this year a private company called Space Imaging made history by distributing the first high-resolution satellite images of a North Korean ballistic missile site. Their photos had a one-meter resolution, providing the public a detailed look at the missile facilities of this rogue nation. Ruts in the road used by North Korean trucks could be seen.

The industry for commercial satellites is growing steadily. In 1994 President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 23 which permitted the Commerce Department to license 12 U.S. companies to operate remote-sensing satellites. Space Imaging and Aerial Images, the company which took the Area 51 pictures, may be the first two of these companies to get a satellite aloft, but there are more to come. At least two other U.S. companies plan on launching satellites this year and several foreign companies have similar plans.

Legal restrictions surrounding these photo purchases are few. Imaging companies do not have to identify either their customers or their pictures. An amendment to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act prohibits U.S. companies from selling satellite images of Israel that show objects with a diameter under 6 feet. Any sale of images to a terrorist state or any regime under U.S. or international sanctions is also prohibited. Aside from these restrictions, there are virtually no limitations on any satellite or any sale of satellite pictures. And even these restrictions are going to be harder to maintain as competition increases from more companies outside the United States.

At the moment, the images are expensive, limited in coverage but not difficult to purchase. Foreign governments, private groups or individuals can now place their orders. In a competitive market with more countries offering this service, there will be competition to provide more precise pictures, of a greater number of subjects, in a more timely manner, at less cost. The restrictions the U.S. now imposes will be harder to maintain in such a free market. What was secret once, will be secret no longer.

Pictures of Area 51, for example, were provided by a Russian launched satellite. India is also beginning a program to launch high-resolution imaging satellites and Israel is planning to launch its own commercial satellite. American restrictions on satellite images of Israel only apply to American satellites. Soon commercial satellites will also be using radar imaging—and thus will no longer be limited by the need for clear skies—and hyperspectral sensors which permit analysis of chemical characteristics. The United States government has long been part of the action. NASA's Commercial Remote Sensing Program is based at the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi.

But it is clear that as this competitive industry grows in the future, we should examine the impact of commercial satellites on our nation's security. Many have applauded the growth of this industry as a means of keeping the public well-informed and expanding the national discussion on issues of national and international security. It is true that having access to satellite images of other countries does enable the U.S. to monitor more areas around the world, to identify violations of international agreements, detect human rights abuses and watch for possible security threats. It will mean private, non-governmental organizations, such as the one which commissioned the pictures of North Korea, will be watching the world too, and issuing their intelligence bulletins.

This may result in confusing interpretations. Countries could take advantage of the fact that they may be monitored by one of these satellites. Knowing that they are being photographed by a satellite and that these images may be made public, states could attempt to blackmail the international community by staging what appears to be a more robust nuclear program or preparations for a missile test for the benefit of the threatening images that this would produce. After all pictures do not lie, do they? Or they could do exactly the opposite and disguise their advanced defense capabilities so that the images captured and released to the media actually reinforce a rogue nation's efforts to circumvent international law.

This possibility calls to mind the pictures taken last January of the Nodong missile launch site in North Korea. As I mentioned earlier, those pictures depicted a crude missile site and a launch pad that cuts through a rice paddy, making the North Korean facilities appear primitive and unthreatening. But these observations contradict the September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate which believes North Korea to be the country most likely to develop ICBMs capable of threatening the U.S. during the next fifteen years. If the U.S. accepts these pictures as fact and believes that the North Korean missile site is as unthreatening as it appears, should we let down our guard and disregard the threat they may pose to our country? I think not.

Similarly, in March of this year, satellite photos of Pakistan's nuclear facility and missile garrison were taken by a commercial satellite and sold to a Washington-based arms control organization. These images have sparked a public policy debate over their interpretation and international security implications. The organization that purchased these photos insists that they are proof that Pakistan will not be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons program. However, a possible misinterpretation of this data could easily incite a flare-up of the already volatile relationship between Pakistan and India.

We cannot make assumptions about what these pictures mean when constructing our national security policy. Our eyes can deceive us. Photo interpretation is going to open up a new area of commercial employment for former government analysts. This evolving space race of the commercial satellite industry can offer us many military and civilian benefits. It can be an important tool in assisting us to make many of our national security decisions in the future. But we must also be wary about jumping to conclusions from what we see. A single picture may not be worth a thousand words. We must contemplate the use of these commercial satellites carefully and find the way to best utilize them so that they bolster, not threaten, our national security.

Just as Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation devices are now widely accessible, we could have a situation in which an enemy uses GPS to attack an American target identified by commercial satellite imaging. Recently, the White House announced the United States would stop its intentional degradation of the GPS signals available to the public, giving the public access to the precise location system previously possible only for the Department of Defense. Defense is requesting $500 million in FY2001 to sustain and modernize the GPS program. Much of the technology used in commercial space launches came from the military.

This is a strange new world. We need to gain a greater understanding of the implications of this technology on our national security. The technology may be inherently uncontrollable—just as export controls over computer encryption became impossible to sustain. Satellite imagery has the potential to be a major asset to the arms control, human rights, and environmental communities. We are witnessing the birth of a new area of information technology. I would urge my colleagues to consider this issue as we begin to examine American security in the 21st century.

142ND ANNIVERSARY OF THE ADMISSION OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA INTO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

• Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, the State of Minnesota has truly been blessed with a wide array of remarkable gifts. Few places on Earth can boast such diversity amongst its abundant natural resources, prosperous industries, and exceptional people. Today marks the 142nd anniversary of Minnesota's admission as the thirty-second state of the Union, and I want to take this opportunity to reflect on a few of the things that make my state special. This is a difficult speech to make in such a short amount of time, as I am sure I could break Senator THURMOND's twenty-four hour and eighteen minute

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